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Callaway: Actual Damages Recoverable for Loss of Credit or Injury to Credit

CONTRACTS-Damages-Actual Damages Recoverable For
Loss of Credit or Injury to Credit Reputation If Proven
Natural, Probable, and Foreseeable Consequence of Breach.
Mead v. Johnson Group Inc.,'
615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981).
Evadine Mead contracted to sell her real estate agency to Johnson
Group, Inc. in return for the latter's promise to pay all the agency's debts
by March 1, 1976. On April 24, 1976, Mead filed a breach of contract
action against Johnson for failing to pay those debts. The trial court entered judgment for Mead upon a jury verdict that included $3,000 for
damages to her credit reputation.' Holding that loss of credit is not an
element of actual damages,2 the Waco Court of Civil Appeals reformed
the judgment by deleting the $3,000 recovery. Subsequently, the Texas
Supreme Court heard the case on appeal. Held-Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.4 Actual damages are recoverable for the loss of credit or
injury to credit reputation if proven a natural, probable, and foreseeable
consequence of the breach."
The purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract is to put the
injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed.
Moreover, the fact that damages must be paid has been viewed as a
means to prevent breaches and, therefore, to provide some security for

1. Johnson Group, Inc. v. Mead, 605 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part,615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981). After March 24, 1976, Mead was
denied a loan at Oak Hill National Bank, had her accounts at Penny's, Sears, Ward's, and
Yaring's closed, and was denied credit by Exxon, Joske's, Handy Dan, Master Charge, Bank
Americard, and Carte Blanche, among others, Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685,
688 (Tex. 1981).
2. Johnson Group, Inc. v. Mead, 605 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981).

3. Id. at 390.
4. Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. 1981).
5. Id. at 688.
6. E.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U.S. 97, 100 (1920)
(actual loss measured by that which injured party would have had if contract performed);
Smith v. Kinslow, 598 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (complaining
party entitled to recover amount necessary to put him in as good a position as if contract
performed); R. G. McClung Cotton Co. v. Cotton Concentration Co., 479 S.W.2d 733, 738
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff given benefit of bargain by awarding amount that would put him in as good a position as if contract performed); see 5 A.
Corbin, Contracts § 992, at 5.(1964 & Kaufman Supp. 1980).
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business transactions. 7 Actual damages are classified as either general or
special. General damages are those deemed, as a matter of law, to have
been foreseen or contemplated by the parties as a consequence of a
breach.' Special damages are those which are shown, as a matter of fact,
to have been contemplated by the parties.9 Special damages, sometimes
called consequential damages, 0 are allowed when knowledge of special
conditions at the time of contracting is imputed to the defaulting party."
In Texas, actual damages are recoverable for breach of contract when
they naturally arise from the breach and were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.' 2 Proof of damages, in general, requires the

7. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002, at 34 (1964 & Kaufman Supp. 1980). Awarding
damages for such a breach helps "to make possible the vast structure of credit, upon which
so large a part of our modern prosperity depends." Id. § 1002, at 34. A large part of this
structure of credit is consumer credit, including installment loans, long-term mortgages, and
credit cards, which has been expanding rapidly, from $7,116,000 in 1929 to $260,735,000,000

in 1977.

INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC

74 (1979).

8. See, e.g., Anderson Dev. Corp. v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 543 S.W.2d
402, 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (general damages are
those presumed to have been contemplated); Sterling Projects, Inc. v. Fields, 530 S.W.2d
602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (general damages deemed as a matter of law
to be foreseen); First Nat'l Bank v. English, 240 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1951, no writ) (general damages are conclusively presumed to be foreseen).
9. See, e.g., Sterling Projects, Inc. v. Fields, 530 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ) (damage to credit and business reputation not recoverable as special damages
because not foreseen); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Bettes, 407 S.W.2d 307, 316-17 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (special damages not awarded because financial
arrangements between plaintiff and third party not within contemplation of parties); First
Nat'l Bank v. English, 240 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951, no writ) (special
damages not allowed because circumstances not contemplated or anticipated by defendant).
See generally 2 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 6.17.2, 6.17.3 (rev. ed. 1970).
10. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1011, at 87 (1964 & Kaufman Supp. 1980). Corbin suggests abandoning the term "consequential damages" to mean an unforeseeable harm incurred as a "consequence" of the breach because what is really meant is "special" as opposed to "general" damages.
11. See, e.g., Gregory v. Tyler Grain & Storage Co., 341 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1960, no writ) (special damages allowed for breach of contract to store
grain); Martin v. Southern Engine & Pump Co., 130 S.W.2d 1065, 1067 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1939, no writ) (consequential damages may be exempted by agreement
between parties); McKibbin v. Pierce, 190 S.W. 1149, 1151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916,
writ ref'd) (damages allowed because special conditions communicated to defaulting party).
12. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wood, 292 S.W. 200, 201 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
judgm't adopted) (no actual damages because injury to market value not within contempla-

tion of parties at time oil lease executed). See generally 2 McDONALD,

TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE

§ 6.17.3 (rev. ed. 1970); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Butler, 127 Tex. 154, 155, 93
S.W.2d 143, 143 (1936) (must prove that on date of contract defaulting party had notice of
special conditions rendering such damages probable); Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Belcher,
89 Tex. 428, 429-30, 35 S.W. 6, 7 (1896) (carrier not liable for delay in transportation when
at time of contract was unaware special damages would arise from delay). This theory of
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ability to estimate with "reasonable certainty" the amount of monetary
damage sustained as a result of the injury. 3 Damages,4 however, do not
fail because it is impossible to calculate them exactly.'

recovery follows the classic rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Hadley v. Baxendale has been described as the "starting point for all discussion of contract
damage theory." See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 49 (1974). The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 365 adopted the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979). The English court set forth this
rule in the following manner:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract
should be either such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself,
or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854). One interpretation of Hadley v.
Baxendale is that it involves two rules which differentiate between damages which naturally
flow from the breach or are contemplated by the parties (general damages), and those which
arise from special circumstances (consequential damages). See Note, Lost Profits and Hadley v. Baxendale, 19 WASHBURN L. J. 488, 493 n.36 (1980). See generally Adams, Hadley v.

Baxendale and the Contract/Tort Dichotomy, 8 ANGLO-AM. L.

REV.

147, 147 (1979); Danzig,

Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249,
253 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp., Inc. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 804 (5th
Cir. 1973) (cannot base damages on mere opinion; must be proven to reasonable certainty);
Jordan v. Cartwright, 347 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, no writ) (evidence did not establish damages with sufficient degree of certainty to allow jury to calculate
damages); Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952,
no writ) (mere opinion and estimate insufficient to support damages). See also 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1020, at 124 (1964 & Kaufman Supp. 1980). To recover actual damages for a
breach of contract, the "plaintiff must lay a basis for a reasonable estimate of the extent of
his harm, measured in money." Id. § 1020, at 124. Otherwise, only nominal, not actual,
damages are allowed. Id. § 1001, at 29.
14. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379
(1927) (damages for lost profits not uncertain if reasonable basis for computation offered);
Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 427-28, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (1938) (uncertainty as to amount will not preclude recovery); Copenhaver v. Berryman, 602 S.W.2d
540, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (data for lost profits recovery sufficient if supports degree of certainty; exact calculation not necessary). Texas courts
have used the same language in denying recovery for lost profits of a new business as they
have used with loss of credit claims. Compare Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 447 F.2d 660, 671 (5th Cir. 1971) (damages for lost profits of new business not allowed
because based only on speculation and conjecture) and Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Executive Sportsman Ass'n, 477 S.W.2d 920, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (prospective profits from new enterprise with no history too remote and speculative to
be actual damages) and Wade v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 352 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1961, no writ) (lost profits claim by new attorney uncertain) with Traweek v.
Martin-Brown Co., 79 Tex. 460, 464, 14 S.W. 564, 566 (1890) (cannot permit jury to consider
damages too remote to be strictly compensable) and Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35, 47
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Historically, Texas courts have denied the recovery of actual damages
for loss of credit or injury to credit reputation."5 In Traweek v. MartinBrown Co., 16 a wrongful attachment case, the Texas Supreme Court
stated that loss of credit was not an element of actual damages, but could
be considered as exemplary damages.17 Exemplary damages, however, are

(1876) (special damage for loss of credit too remote and speculative) and Galloway v. Morris
249 S.W. 284, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ) (injury to credit too speculative to be considered).
15. See, e.g., Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co., 79 Tex. 460, 463-64, 14 S.W. 564, 566
(1890) (disallowed actual damages for injury to credit for wrongful attachment of
merchant's property); Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 409, 415, 13 S.W. 315, 316 (1890) (levy on
small portion of merchant's stock not proximate cause of injury to credit); Streetman v.
Lasater, 185 S.W. 930, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1916, no writ) (allowed damage to
credit reputation as exemplary but not actual damages for wrongful distress warrant on
cotton and property).
16. 79 Tex. 460, 14 S.W. 564 (1890). The court refused to allow recovery of actual damages on the grounds that merchant's credit was injured because defendant's attachment
caused plaintiff's other creditors to also issue attachments also. See id. at 464, 14 S.W. at
566. The court cited Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35 (1876) as authority for the proposition
that loss of credit is not an element of actual damages. See id. at 464, 14 S.W. at 565. In
Wallace the court noted in that loss of credit resulting from the seizure of goods was too
remote and speculative, but did not specifically state that loss of credit cannot be an element of actual damages. See Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35, 47 (1876). But cf. Elizarraras v.
Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (damages allowed for wrongful dishonor of a check under the " trader rule"); First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375, 378
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (actual damages recoverable if wrongful
dishonor occurs through bank's mistake); Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718, 719
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (in suit for loss of credit consequential damages allowed for intentional wrongful dishonor of check). Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, Texas courts may allow actual damages for loss of credit in actions for
wrongful dishonor of a check. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.402, Comment 3
(Vernon 1968).
17. Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co., 79 Tex. 460, 464, 14 S.W. 564, 566 (1890).. . .This
view was widely followed in subsequent wrongful attachment cases. See, e.g., Neese v. Radford, 83 Tex. 585, 587, 19 S.W. 141, 141-42 (1892) (injury to credit by wrongful levy may be
considered only as exemplary damages); First Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 12 S.W.2d 271, 274
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, writ ref'd) (loss of credit an element of exemplary damages
in wrongful attachment); Ullmann, Stern & Krausse, Inc. v. Rogers, 288 S.W. 1109, 1110
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ) (injury to credit not element of actual damages); accord, Bridwell v. Anderson, 156 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Ark. 1941) (in wrongful levy action damages for loss of credit uncertain, conjectural, and unestablished by evidence); Birch
Ranch & Oil Co. v. Campbell, 43 Cal. App.2d 624, 111 P.2d 445, 447 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941)
(in wrongful execution on business property damages for injury to credit too remote to allow
actual damage recovery); Union Nat'l Bank v. Cross, 75 N.W. 992, 996 (Wis. 1898) (in
wrongful attachment suit injury to credit too speculative for actual damage recovery). The
Waco Court of Civil Appeals in the only breach of contract case involving an actual damages
claim for harm to credit, relied on the line of wrongful attachment cases and refused to
allow actual damages for injury to the credit or business reputation of a subcontractor. See
Sterling Projects, Inc. v. Fields, 503 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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not allowed in the absence of a finding of actual damages. 8 Denial of
actual damages for loss of credit was based on the rationale that such
damages were too remote or speculative in terms of proof.19
In Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc.,20 the Texas Supreme Court did not
view Traweek as an obstacle to recovery of actual damages,2" but rather
as a case decided at a time when loss of credit was too remote and speculative to be recoverable as actual damages.22 The court observed that the
precedents for this proposition were decided in an era when most commercial transactions were for cash, while today many transactions, both
personal and commercial, depend on credit.2 3 The court viewed the loss of

credit as a foreseeable consequence of a contract breach because the use
of credit has become so widespread. 2 4 Damages are, therefore, recoverable
if there is evidence that "the injury was the natural, probable, and fore-

18. See, e.g., Neese v. Radford, 83 Tex. 585, 587, 19 S.W. 141, 141-42 (1892) (injury to
credit by wrongful levy on interest in business partnership may be considered only as exemplary damages); Ullmann, Stern & Krausse, Inc. v. Rogers, 288 S.W. 1109, 1110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ) (no exemplary damages for injury to credit because actual
damages not proven in wrongful levy on merchandise); Galloway v. Morris, 249 S.W. 284,
285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ) (nominal damages not recoverable for loss
of credit in absence of actual damages).
19. See, e.g., Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co., 79 Tex. 460, 464, 14 S.W. 564, 566 (1890)
(cannot permit jury to consider damages too remote to be strictly compensable); Wallace v.
Finberg, 46 Tex. 35, 47 (1876) (special damage for loss of credit too remote and speculative);
Galloway v. Morris, 249 S.W. 284, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ) (injury to
credit too speculative to be considered).
20. 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981).
21. Id. at 688.
22. See id. at 688.
23. See id. at 688; See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1920,
1930, 1940, 1950, 1980). An examination of the indexes of the Statistical Abstracts from
1920 to .1980 reveals that in the 1920 index there is no.listing for credit or mortgages. In
1930 no listing for credit appears although 17.6% of urban homes and 17.4% of rural homes
were mortgaged. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1930). A chart on installment loans appears in the 1940 index. Id. at 251 (1940). Credit unions appear in the index in
1944 and in 1950 there is a "consumer credit" entry showing total consumer credit rising
from $6,821,000,000 in 1930 to $18,779,000,000 in 1949. Id. at 416 (1950). By 1980 consumer
credit had risen to $373.4 billion, including installment loans and credit cards. Id. at 540
(1980). In 1978 long-term mortgage loans totalled $999.8 billion, up from $3,234 million in
1940. Id. at 539 (1980) and at 251 (1940). As the court points out, a good credit rating is
crucial to economic survival. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981).
One commentator describes the habitual use of credit and debt as money in our society as
follows: "Credit, not cash, is the medium through which the income of different members of
society is distributed to them .... the means by which they provide for their different
necessities . . . it is in credit, not cash, that they count their wealth." R. HENDRICKSON, THE
CASHLESS SOCIETY 158 (1972).
24. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981).
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seeable consequence of the breach .... -2 As the court pointed out, allowing actual damages for loss of credit is not a departure from general
contract7 damage rules, 26 but rather a recognition of damages if they are
2
proven.

Although the Mead Court adopted a sound rule allowing actual damages for loss of credit or injury to credit reputation,28 it neglected to provide guidelines for determining what type of evidence would be necessary
to prove actual damages. 29 A likely explanation for the court's failure to
enumerate such guidelines is that the evidence introduced at Mead's trial
appeared to contradict the jury's finding that the defendant's breach was
the proximate cause of Mead's loss of credit.30 As noted by the Waco
25. Id. at 688.
26. See id. at 688. Although the supreme court did not address this issue, the problem
with relying on a line of wrongful attachment cases to formulate a rule of contract recovery
is that a wrongful attachment suit is a common law tort action, whereby the plaintiff seeks
to sue out of an attachment levied without probable cause. See, e.g., Gale v. Transamerica
Corp., 382 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Cahn Bros. & Co. v. Bonnett, 62 Tex. 674,
676 (1884); M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 229-30 (8th ed. 1907). Theories of damage
recovery in contract and tort differ, especially as to exemplary damages. In tort actions the
purpose of awarding exemplary or punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer for his outrageous conduct and to deter similar future conduct. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 9-10 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, at 464 (1977). The purpose of contract damages, however, is compensation for the injured party in order to make him whole again, not
punishment of the wrongdoer. Exemplary damages, therefore, are not allowed for breach of
contract unless the breach also gives rise to an independent tort. See 5 A. CORGIN, CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1964 & Kaufman Supp. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 369, Comment a at 112 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979).
27. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981).
28. See 2 A. CORaIN, CONTRACTS § 1007, at 128 (Kaufman Supp. 1980). Professor Kaufman points out that there is no reason why damage to credit reputation should not be allowed. Id. at 128. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981).
29. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685,688 (Tex. 1981). The court simply noted the decision was a recognition of the principle that damages may be allowed if
proven. See id. at 688. Proof of damage to credit reputation is difficult because it is an
intangible concept of property, similar to good will. Texas courts have recognized good will
as a property which may be damaged or destroyed and for which the owner is entitled to
damages for its destruction. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Mercer, 127 Tex. 220, 225-26, 90
S.W.2d 557, 560 (1936) (good will, although intangible, is property and damages may be
recovered for destruction thereof); Taormina v. Culicchia, 355 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (good will considered valuable intangible asset); Scott
v. Doggett, 226 S.W.2d 183, 187-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ refd n.r.e.) (recovery allowed for damages to good will of grocery business). See generally Note, Consequential Damages: The Loss of Goodwill, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 106, 107 (1971). Damage to good will
can be recovered as special damages if it is shown to be reasonably foreseeable that damage
would result from the wrong done. Loss of good will is considered as exemplary damages
absent such proof. See Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Executive Sportsman Ass'n, 477
S.W.2d 920, 928-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Mead's major contention attrial was that prior to the contract date of December
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Court of Civil Appeals, Mead had some $75,000 in personal debts, including $29,000 in open accounts and consumer debt, many of which were
delinquent.3 1 The Texas Supreme Court, however, decided that the evidence was legally sufficient under a "no evidence" point of error viewed in
a light most favorable to the jury finding.3s In so doing, the court correctly did not consider contradictory evidence. 3 A civil appeals court
presented with similar facts could nevertheless justifiably hold that such

19, 1975, she had never been denied credit, but after March 24, 1976, she was denied credit
many times. See Record, Vol. I at 109-11. Mead testified that Penny's, Sears, and Wards
closed her charge accounts because she was four or five months delinquent and that even
though she had paid off the balance, the stores refused to reopen the accounts. Yarings
reopened her account after having closed it, but refused to raise it to its past limit. Id. Vol.
VIII at 1594-96. These closed accounts were offered as proof that Johnson's breach of contract damaged her credit. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981).
When asked if any of the creditors whom Johnson had agreed to pay had denied her credit,
Mead replied she had not asked any of them for credit. See Record, Vol. VII at 1301. In
fact, Oak Hill National Bank, listed in the supreme court opinion as a lender who denied
her credit, is shown by the trial record to have refused her credit because at the time a car
note she had co-signed was delinquent, not because Johnson failed to pay the SBA loan held
by Oak Hill. See id. Vol. VIII at 1590-91. Subsequently, the bank made her two loans:
$5,000 to start another real estate business and $1,500 unsecured. See id. Vol. VII at 131112. One of the most common rules of damage recovery in contract is that the plaintiff's
injury cannot be too remote from the defendant's conduct which caused the breach - a
requirement of proximate cause. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 997, at 19 (1964 & Kaufman
Supp. 1980). To establish proximate cause, it is not enough simply to show that the injury
occurred; plaintiff must prove a causal relationship between that injury and defendant's
breach. Id. § 997, at 21. An examination of the trial record reveals no testimony from the
bank, or any of the merchants who denied her credit, that they did so because a credit
report indicated any unpaid trade accounts. It is apparent, therefore, that Mead's credit
reputation was damaged by her delinquencies in payment rather than Johnson's failure to
retire the trade accounts. If several factors have combined to produce the injury, the defendant's breach must be a substantial factor in causing the injury. Id. § 999 at 24-25.
31. See Johnson Group, Inc. v. Mead, 605 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981). See also Record, Vol. VII
at 1284. The civil appeals court did not have to reach the issue of "no evidence" because it
sustained Johnson's first contention that as a matter of law, under Traweek, actual damages
were not recoverable for loss of credit. See Johnson Group, Inc. v. Mead, 605 S.W.2d 386,
389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 615 S.W.2d 685 (1981).
The court, however, did consider the evidence as to Mead's personal indebtedness important enough to note it in the opinion. See id. at 389.
32. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981).
33. See, e.g., McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1980)
(evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to jury finding); East Texas Theatres, Inc.
v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. 1970) (must view evidence in most favorable light in
support of verdict); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965) (Court must consider
only evidence supporting jury finding and disregard all evidence to the contrary. See generally Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,38 TEx. L. REV.
361, 362-64 (1960).
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a jury finding is factually insufficient under an "insufficient evidence"
point of error and remand for a new trial.-4 Lower courts are thus left
without a means of determining whether evidence of loss of credit supports an actual damage recovery. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Elizarrarasv. Bank of El Paso,35 , however, has offered
suggestions as to what evidence would prove injury to a business credit
reputation-evidence which could arguably be applied to loss of credit in
general." Such evidence includes size of business, past income, future
prospects, and the need for and prior use of credit. 7
The rule adopted by the court in Mead applies, by analogy, to damages
for lost profits of an unestablished business.3 8 In Texas, anticipated profits are not recoverable for an unestablished business or a business which
has operated at a loss" because these profits are not capable of being
established to a degree of certainty required by law. 0 As with loss of

34. See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); Calvert, "No Evidence" and
"Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEx. L. REV. 361, 365-66 (1960).
35. 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980). Elizarras involves application of the "trader rule"
which does not require a businessman to prove actual damages for wrongful dishonor of a
check to recover for damage to credit reputation. Id. 'at 375-76. The court cites the rationale
for such a rule to be "that it is too difficult to prove any specific loss of income was caused
by . . . a loss of credit." Id. at 377 The court accepts that principle, but states that even
under the trader rule, some evidence must be required to reduce jury speculation. Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 377.
37. Id. at 377; cf. Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260, 268
(Minn. 1980) (proof of new business's lost profits includes experience and expertise of owner, and market for product or profitability of similar business).
38. Compare Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688'(Tei. 1981) (damages
for credit loss allowed if foreseeable and proven with certainty) with J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL' CODE

§ 10-4, at 391 (2d ed. 1980) (recovery for lost profits if

foreseeable and certainty requirement met). Lost profits of unestablished businesses is one
of the most commonly litigated items of consequential damages. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

10-4, at 391 (2d ed. 1980).

39. See, e.g., Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1979)
(prospective profits on newly opened franchise operating at a loss not recoverable); Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Executive Sportsman Ass'n, 477 S.W.2d 920, 929 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no actual damages for lost profits of new enterprises
with no history); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Slick's Estate, 386 S.W.2d 180, 189-90
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964) (uranium mining speculative business; recovery of lost
profits denied), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 403 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1966). But cf. Harper
Bldg. Systems, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 564 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (new business had definite contracts to manufacture portable buildings
upon which future profit estimate could be based).
40. See, e.g., Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 427-28, 115 S.W.2d 1097,
1099 (1938) (lost profits recovery allowed because evidence established loss with reasonable
certainty); Barbier v. Barry, 345 S.W.2d 557; 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ)
(profits from unestablished business not susceptible of proof to degree of certainty law requires); Silberstein v. Laibovitz, 200 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ)
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credit, the problem with allowing recovery for lost profits of a new buiiness is that they are considered highly speculative."' Certain jurisdictions,
however, allow a new business to collect for lost profits if the business can
present factual data to predict lost profits."2 This trend effectively replaces the "new business" with a "sufficiency of the evidence" test.48 By
allowing actual damages under these circumstances, these courts have
recognized that the improvement in market data and forecasting techniques make lost profits of a new business less speculative and more susceptible to proof." Although Texas courts have not yet adopted this view

(denied recovery of lost profits for breach of business rental lease because failed to establish
damages by competent proof); accord, Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 112 A.2d
901, 904 (Md. 1955) (new business profit speculative and incapable of ascertainment).
41. See, e.g., Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 671 (5th Cir.
1971) (damages for lost profits of new business denied because based only on speculation
and conjecture); Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Executive Sportsman Ass'n., 477 S.W.2d
920, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (prospective profits from new enterprise too remote and speculative to be actual damages); Wade v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
352 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no writ) (lost profits claim by new attorney too uncertain). See generally Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of
Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L. J. 992, 999 (1956).

42. See, e.g., Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Mich. 1976) (new business may recover lost profits for breach of contract if justified by evidence); Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1980) (although more difficult
to prove prospective profits of a new business, no law proscribes it); Ferrell v. Elrod, 469
S.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Tenn. 1971) (no reason to penalize new business by denying recovery if
evidence supports prospective profits). See generally Comment, A Case for Recovery: Damages for Lost Profits of an Unestablished Business, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1081, 1087

(1979). The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals has stated that lost profits of a new business
would not be denied if factual data was available to compute losses. See Barbier v. Barry,
345 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ) citing Pace Corporation v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340 (1955)). The Texas Supreme Court in Pace Corp. v.
Jackson, allowed for lost profits to a new business, but stressed that this business was established in the sense that it continued to operate past the trial date and show a profit. See
Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 190, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348 (1955). Additionally, the
business was established on the strength of the contract and discontinued because of the
breach. Id. at 190, 284 S.W.2d at 348. In such an instance, recovery can be had because the
contract provides sufficiently specific information upon which to determine future profits.
See Page v. Hancock, 200 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).'
43. See, e.g., Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 1953)
(rejected "new business rule"; focused on sufficiency of evidence); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc.,
242 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Mich. 1976) (lost profits should not be denied merely because hard to
prove); Brenneman v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 491 P.2d 992, 994 n.1 (Or. 1971) (question is whether
lost profits can be proved with reasonable certainty). See generally R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 119 (1978) (trend is development of a rule of law into a rule of
evidence).
44. See Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn.
1980) (proven existence of a market supports new business, lost profits recovery); Larsen v.
Walton Plywood Co., 390 P.2d 677, 687 (Wash. 1964) (expert testimony and analysis of
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in terms of new business profits, the allowance of actual damages for loss
of credit is based on the same principle. s
The Texas Supreme Court in Mead found the rule of general foreseeability to be applicable to loss of credit recovery for breach of contract."
Because Mead recognized injury to credit as being within the reasonable
contemplation of parties who contract in an area affecting business or
personal credit, parties who incur such losses are now assured a remedy if
they can meet the burden of proof.47 The types of evidence necessary to
constitute such proof, however, remain uncertain. Future courts and the
practitioner are, therefore, without evidentiary guidelines upon which to
appraise similar fact situations. Nevertheless, the Mead rationale is logically adaptable to the issue of damages for lost profits of a new business
and could be used as support for the argument that Texas courts should
afford unestablished businesses the same opportunity to recover damages
if they can prove their losses by a sufficiency of the evidence.
Sharon Callaway

market conditions take lost profits out of realm of uncertainty). See generally Comment,
Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65
YALE L. J. 992, 1018-19 (1956).
45. Compare Ferrell v. Elrod, 469 S.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Tenn. 1971) (no reason to penalize new business by denying recovery if evidence supports prospective profits recovery) with
Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981) (actual damages for loss of
credit is allowed if proven by evidence).
46. See Mead v. Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. 1981).
47. See id. at 688.
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